Tactical IO Planning

Tactical IO

Tactical-level IO contributes to achieving strategic and operational objectives. Operational- and Strategic-level IO facilitate tactical operations. . . IO can be a potent force multiplier during offensive, defensive, and support operations, and may be the decisive operation during stability operations.

FM 3-13

Tactical IO Planning

- As in all planning, MA is the foundation of a good plan
- In combat operations, IO is normally a shaping operation
- In COIN, **IO based operations may be the decisive operation** – supported by maneuver operations.

“The Foundation”
IO Mission Analysis (1 of 2)

- **Define the information environment**
  - Terrain, Demographics
  - Societal structure and organizations
  - Government/Independent information infrastructure. Location
  - Media organizations, orientations, controlling interests
  - Role of external actors
  - Information – key ideologies/perceptions
- **Analyze higher HQs (2 levels up) IO campaign goals and objectives, and mission end-state**
- **Extract specified and implied “maneuver” and IO tasks**

MOE Indicator Tracker

					Goal 3: Support US/Coalition operations to remove or apprehend threat elements and neutralize resistance to US/Coalition operations										
					Objective 1: Eliminate hostile threat elements										
	Rpt. Agency				#of instances involving anti-US/Coalition graffiti	#of offensive gestures directed at US/Coalition patrols by Iraqi civilians	#of IED attacks	#of attacks on Coalition Forces	#of attacks involving 60mm or greater	#of reported IEDs	#of FF/FRL captured/killed	#of attacks against civilians	*	*	*
UNIT AOR	**ZONE**	**3BCT**			**11**	**4**	**7**	**4**	**5**	**0**	**11**	**7**			
TF 1-23	11	MOSALAH			1	0	1	1	3	0	3	2			
	12				2	0	0	1	2	0	0	1			
	23	RASOURI			0	0	2	0	0	0	2	0			
	24				1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1			
TF4-56	25	SADIQ			7	3	4	2	0	0	6	3			

“The Foundation”
IO Mission Analysis (2 of 2)

- Evaluate the threat
  - Information infrastructure
  - Means of collecting, processing, and disseminating information.
  - Vulnerabilities and susceptibilities of key sub-groups
    - Junior enlisted
    - Junior officer
    - Senior officer

“Build the House”
COA Development

- Develop objectives, operational or tactical, to support strategic objectives.
- In turn develop the criteria of success for each objective.
- Refine your IO IPB based on PIR/IR
- Determine or refine the supporting task for each objective
- Refine, develop Measures of Effectiveness (Indicators) for each Objective. Are we achieving the desired behavior?
  - MOE along with Combat Assessment (CA) let’s us know!

Assessments

Assessments

The continuous monitoring—throughout planning, preparation and execution—of the current situation and progress of an operation, and the evaluation of it against criteria of success to make decisions and adjustments. (FM 3-0)

Information = Power

Information Superiority: the operational advantage derived from the ability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary's ability to do the same (FM 3-0).

Impact Assessment and Trend Analysis

- Impact Assessment: A PSYOP tool used to determine the effectiveness of an operation by providing indicators of behaviors or attitudes relative to the operation's objectives. Can be used to:
  - Provide indicators that objectives are resulting in the desired 2nd and 3rd order effects.
  - Determine effectiveness of the information operation.
- Trend Analysis: Measures changes in the operating environment. Can be used to:
  - Organize observed activities in the information environment in a way that assists the drawing of conclusions.
  - Provide indirect indicators (e.g., events/actions not conclusively correlated to the information operation, but may be the result of IO) to support estimation of aggregate IO effects.

Example Assessment Products for Briefings

Example Trend Analysis

Negative Incidents	
• Violence against Friendly Force	2
• Interference w/ Friendly Force	5
• Ethnic Violence	2
• Political Violence	2
• Civil Disobedience	0
• Hostile Propaganda	1
• Other Incidents	1
	Total 16

Positive Incidents	
• Peaceful Demonstrations	1
• Refugees & IDPs	0
• Other Positive Incidents	2
• Populace Cooperation	3
	Total 6

Four Week Assessment Period (January)



33% Increase in Negative Incidents

Example Impact Indicator Analysis

IO Objectives	Indicators	Assessment
Influence populace to support US operations	3 Violent demonstrations directed against US Forces Tensions easing between Governor A and US Forces Political leaders publicly praise US presence and operations	A No Change
Deny insurgent support from local populace	Insurgents paid rewards to kill pro-US government officials 3 Incidents of insurgent recruiting Increased populace reporting on insurgent activity	R No Change
Disrupt extremist influence	Hardliner rally poorly attended Local newspaper denounces extremist leader	G Improvement

See 1st IO Command Assessment Aid for further details

Impact Assessment

- Impact indicators are observable behavior that indicate success or failure to achieve the IO objectives.
- Two types of indicators: Positive – Activity that correlates with the objectives' effects. Negative – Activity that is opposite of the the objectives' desired effects.

ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY

- **Objective assessments are analogous to training methodology of T,P,U.**
- **MOE is an indicator versus a "report card"**

Effects on target, sustain actions if more effects are necessary or cease actions if effects are attained. Current targeting is valid.

Some effects achieved but desired effect not yet attained. Sustain some target schemes. Modify remaining targeting scheme to account for shortfall.

Desired effects clearly not attained. New targets or delivery methods required.

***The arrow indicates the direction of the trend (upward, downward, steady)**

Example
Impact Assessment

- **Goal 1: Establish and Maintain a Stable and Secure Environment throughout AOR XXXXX**
  - Objective 1: Monitor and enforce UNSCR xxxx
  - Objective 2: Promote stability within TF X AOR
  - Objective 3: Promote stability along the XXXX border
  - Objective 4: Destroy Non-Compliant Forces
  - Objective 5: Establish SASE to support refugee returns
  - Objective 6: Maintain irrefutable impartiality among tribes
  - Objective 7: Protect the force
  - Objective 8: Protect designated persons or property
  - Objective 9: Support the International Criminal Tribunal

Trend Analysis

1. Determine frequency of analysis.
2. Determine what activity / events must be recorded.
3. Establish baseline activity.
4. Measure and analyze magnitude and rates of change to the baseline in terms of time, place, and type of activity.

MOE Indicator Tracker

					Goal 3: Support US/Coalition operations to remove or apprehend threat elements and neutralize resistance to US/Coalition operations	Objective 1: Eliminate hostile threat elements	#of instances involving anti-US/Coalition graffiti	#of offensive gestures directed at US/Coalition patrols by Iraqi civilians	#of IED attacks	#of attacks on Coalition Forces	#of attacks involving 60mm or greater	#of reported IEDs	#of FF/FRL captured/killed	#of attacks against civilians	*	*	*
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	23	RASOURI			0	0	2	0	0	0	2	0			
	24				1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1			
TF4-56	25	SADIQ			7	3	4	2	0	0	6	3			

Trend Tracking Spreadsheet

	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV
GOAL 1:Maintain a Safe and Secure Environment throughout the AOR						
Objective 1: Monitor and enforce UNSCR XXXX						
	JUN	**JUL**	**AUG**	**SEP**	**OCT**	**NOV**
Number of weapons turned in legally	**2**	**3**	**1**			
*Number of weapons seized during searches	**9**	**8**	**7**			
*Number of weapon violations per month	**4**	**5**	**6**			
*Number of weapon searches per month	**6**	**6**	**25**			
Number of incidents at sites or escorts we have "unfixed"	**0**	**0**	**0**			
*Number of TF operations hindered by actions of the local populace	**0**	**1**	**0**			
*Number of activities canceled because of security concerns	**0**	**0**	**0**			
Number of threats against TF, GO, NGO	**N/A**	**0**	**0**			

“Build the House”
COA Development

- Develop Spheres of Influence for key population and threat leaders– may drive your unit boundaries
- Develop Tasks to IO Assets and Subordinate Units
- Develop or refine Themes and Messages, and Talking Points

“Crisis Action Planning”

- Include IO planner in planning team
- Develop IO Battle Drills – Battle Drills Based on Lessons Learned and Known TTPs
- Use IO to
  - Shape the Operation
  - Reinforce Success
  - Build Plan for “BAD News”
    - Collateral Damage
    - Civilian Casualties
    - Disruption to Civilian Life
  - Deter Future Hostile Acts By Shaping Behavior

Effects Based Operations in Counter-Insurgency & SOSO

Effects Based Operations

Effect:

- power to bring about a result
- a distinctive impression
- the creation of a desired impression
- to cause to come into being
- to bring about often by surmounting obstacles

Effects Based Operations

"A mission statement contains the *who*, *what*, *when*, *where*, and *why* associated with a specific operation. The *what* and *why* of a mission statement are not the same thing and both are needed. The *what* is an **effect** that is normally measurable. The *why* of a mission statement provides the mission's purpose or reason."

FM 3-90

Effects Based Operations

ACTIONS BY FRIENDLY FORCE		EFFECTS ON ENEMY FORCE
Assault*	Follow and Assume	Block
Attack-by-Fire	Follow and Support	Canalize
Breach	Linkup*	Contain
Bypass	Occupy	Defeat
Clear	Reconstitutioin**	Destroy
Combat Search and Rescue	Reduce	Disrupt
Consolidation & Reorganization*	Retain	Fix
Control	Secure	Interdict
Counterreconnaissaince	Seize	Isolate
Disengagement	Support-by-Fire	Neutralize
Exfiltrate	Suppress	Penetrate
		Turn

TYPES AND FORMS OF OPERATIONS

MOVEMENT TO CONTACT*
- Search and Attack*

ATTACK*
- Ambush*
- Demonstration*
- Feint*
- Raid*
- Spoiling Attack*

EXPLOITATION*

PURSUIT*

FORMS OF OFFENSIVE MANEUVER*
- Envelopment*
- Frontal Attack*
- Infiltration*
- Penetration*
- Turning Movement*

AREA DEFENSE*

MOBILE DEFENSE**

RETROGRADE OPERATIONS*
- Delay*
- Withdrawal*
- Retirement

RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS**

SECURITY OPERATIONS*

INFORMATION OPERATIONS**

COMBINED ARMS BREACH OPERATIONS**

PASSAGE OF LINES*

RELIEF IN PLACE*

RIVER CROSSING OPERATIONS**

TROOP MOVEMENT*
- Administrative Movement*
- Approach March*
- Road March*

*Defined elsewhere in this manual

**Defined in other manuals

FM 3-90

Effects Based Operations



Effects Planning Cycle



What is Operational/Tactical IO in COIN really about?

- As Mao told us, the population is the center of gravity in an insurgent war. Victory depends on the majority of the population at least passively resisting the insurgents, and a significant minority actively resisting.
- Popular support can also garner us timely and accurate intelligence that allows us to launch focused attacks against HPTs – a key component in setting the conditions for their defeat in the court of 'popular opinion'.

What is Operational/Tactical IO in COIN really about?

- **80% of IO at division and below in COIN is PSYOP**. We are attempting to elicit (influence)the behavior's we want from the target audience:
  - **Population**; Passively/Actively resist the insurgents.
  - **Insurgents**; Lay down arms and return to the political process.
  - **External actors**; (usually handled by JTF) Cease external support for insurgents/continue support for legal government.
- All other IO activities are focused on supporting this influence task

What is Operational/Tactical IO in COIN really about?

- "Everything is PSYOP, and in COIN, PSYOP is just about everything"
  - Every action you take or don't take sends a message to the three primary COIN target audiences, and will generate a behavior.
  - Likewise every word you speak or don't speak.
- Continuously evaluate and shape your words and deeds IOT ensure they support getting you to your desired endstate

Example Scenario



Deliberate Attack against a suspected terrorist cell safe house. One company establishes a cordon and another company conducts the attack. The terrorist safe house is suspected to be in Building 2. Building 7 is suspected to be their weapons and ammunition storage area. The town is considered neutral to coalition forces and is being threatened by the terrorist cell.

EFET #1									
TASK									
OBJECTIVE			**FORMATION**			**FUNCTION**			
DESTROY			REINFORCEMENTS of the 91st ASLT BN			ATTEMPTING TO INFLUENCE ATTACK IN TAKIRA			
PURPOSE									
ALLOW THE MAIN EFFORT COMPANY TO COMPLETE ATTACK ON BUILDINGS 2 AND 7 WITHOUT INTERFERANCE FROM REINFORCING TERRORIST ELEMENTS.									
METHOD									
	FA (DS)	**FA (GS)**	**CAS**	**AI**	**NSFS**	**EW**	**PSYOP**	**PA**	**CA**
TARGET(S)	AF 5000 AF 5001		AF 5002						
TIME	H - 1 thru H + 7		H - 1 thru H + 7						
LOCATION(S)	WQ 022450 WQ 020436		WQ035420						
OBSERVER(S)	A COMPANY		COLT 1						
ATTACK GUIDANCE	DESTROY		DESTROY						
COMMUNICATIONS	FH 350		UHF 35.600						
FSCMs	NFA 01		NFA 01						
EFFECTS									
REINFORCEMENTS DESTROYED PRIOR TO REACHING ROADBLOCKS									

EFST #2									
TASK									
OBJECTIVE			**FORMATION**			**FUNCTION**			
LIMIT			ABILITY OF TAKIRA TERRORIST CELL			TO COMMUNICATE DUIRNG ATTACK			
PURPOSE									
ALLOW THE MAIN EFFORT COMPANY TO COMPLETE ATTACK ON BUILDINGS 2 AND 7 WITHOUT INTERFERANCE FROM REINFORCING TERRORIST ELEMENTS.									
METHOD									
	FA (DS)	**FA (GS)**	**CAS**	**AI**	**NSFS**	**EW**	**PSYOP**	**PA**	**CA**
TARGET(S)						CELL PHONES			
TIME						H Tru H +7			
LOCATION(S)						TAKIRA			
OBSERVER(S)									
ATTACK GUIDANCE						JAM			
COMMUNICATIONS						FH 350			
FSCMs									
EFFECTS									
TAKIRA TERRORIST CELL UNABLE TO USE CELL PHONES TO COMMUNICATE DURING ATTACK									

EFST #3									
TASK									
OBJECTIVE			**FORMATION**			**FUNCTION**			
INFLUENCE			CITIZENS OF TAKIRA			TO SUPPORT COALITION FORCES.			
PURPOSE									
PROVIDE INFORMATION AND ASSISTANCE TO THE CITIZENS OF TAKIRA FOLLOWING THE ATTACK ON THE TERRORIST CELL									
METHOD									
	FA (DS)	**FA (GS)**	**CAS**	**AI**	**NSFS**	**EW**	**PSYOP**	**PA**	**CA**
TARGET(S)							TAKIRA		TAKIRA
TIME							H+8 thru H + 16		H+8 thru H + 16
LOCATION(S)							TAKIRA		TAKIRA
OBSERVER(S)									
ATTACK GUIDANCE							INFORM CITIZENS OF LOCATION OF MEDICAL ASSISTANCE TEAM		PROVIDE MEDICAL ASSISTANCE TEAM AND WATER ANALYSIS TEAM
COMMUNICATIONS							FH 350		FH 350
FSCMs									
EFFECTS									
CITIZENS OF TAKIRA SUPPORT COALITION OPERATIONS									

Information Operations

Everything we touch has become faster, more efficient, or otherwise improved by the information revolution.